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 Abstract 
Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycle theory suggests that all subnational officials 
will raise fiscal spending during elections.  Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycle theory 
suggests that only left-leaning governments will raise election year fiscal spending, with 
right-leaning parties choosing the reverse.  This study assesses which of these competing 
logics applies to debt policy choices.  Cross-sectional time-series analysis of yearly loan 
acquisition across Mexican municipalities – on statistically matched municipal 
subsamples to balance creditworthiness across left- and right-leaning governments – 
shows that all parties engage in electoral policy cycles but not in the way originally 
thought.  It also shows that different parties favored different types of loans, although not 
always according to partisan predictions.  Both electoral and partisan logics thus shape 
debt policy decisions – in contrast to fiscal policy where these logics are mutually 
exclusive – because debt policy involves decisions on multiple dimensions, about the 
total and type of loans. 
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Introduction 
Decentralized subnational debt policy rights are considered critical for promoting 
social welfare and economic development because they allow subnational governments to 
finance public works (Canuto and Liu 2010b; Dillinger and Webb 1999; Farvacque-
Vitkovic and Kopanyi 2014; Johnson 1996; Sáez 2016).  However, overly burdensome 
debt loads and repayment terms can reduce the resources available for other public 
expenditures (Heller 2005; Sáez 2016), undermining the developmental goals that 
subnational debt rights were intended to support (De Mello 2001; Giugale et al. 2000a; 
Sáez 2016).  They also risk unsustainable subnational fiscal finances, and national 
macroeconomic instability (Dillinger and Webb 1999; Giugale et al. 2000a; Heller 2005; 
Sáez 2016).  
Scholars note that a variety of structural conditions and functional factors – such 
as low administrative capacity, low fiscal transparency and oversight, vertical fiscal 
imbalances, and inadequate capital market controls – can lead subnational governments 
to assume overly burdensome debt loads (Avellaneda 2009a, b; Canuto and Liu 2010a; 
Cecchetti et al. 2010; Kelemen and Teo 2014; Leigland 1997; Martell and Teske 2007; 
O'Toole and Meier 1999; Rodden 2006).  However, this study argues that subnational 
governments may also respond to political incentives when taking debt decisions as well, 
engaging in opportunistic electoral or ideological partisan debt policy cycles noted to 
affect fiscal policy choices.  Opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycles occur when 
governments of all partisan stripes undertake expansionary economic policies to improve 
voter perceptions of their performance and their electoral prospects at the polls (Alesina 
et al. 1997; Drazen 2001; Eslava 2011; Franzese 2002; Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1975, 
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1978).  Ideological partisan fiscal policy cycles occur when governments implement 
economic policies during election periods geared toward the expansionary or 
contractionary preferences of their left-leaning or right-leaning supporters, respectively, 
to maximize support (e.g., Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Eslava 2011; Franzese 2002; 
Garrett 1998; Hibbs 1987; Rodden 2006; Rodden et al. 2003; Tufte 1978).   
Although most research on opportunistic electoral and ideological partisan policy 
cycles focuses on fiscal policy choices, it may be the case that these dynamics also shape 
debt policy decisions as well.  The presence of opportunistic electoral policy cycles in 
debt decisions would imply that all parties might ramp up debt loads during election 
processes, aggravating the risks of unsustainable subnational fiscal finances and national 
macroeconomic stability (Dillinger and Webb 1999; Giugale et al. 2000a; Heller 2005; 
Sáez 2016).  Although the presence of ideological partisan debt policy cycles would 
mean that only some parties would be driven in this expansionary way, their debt policy 
decisions might lower social welfare and economic development as well (De Mello 2001; 
Giugale et al. 2000a; Sáez 2016).  Subnational incumbents that assume overly 
burdensome and overly costly debt loads – for expansionary ideological partisan or 
opportunistic electoral purposes – reduce the resources available for other public 
spending needs (Heller 2005; Sáez 2016).  Those that avoid taking on large debt burdens 
– because contractionary ideological partisan preferences drive them in this way – may 
harm development by preventing or postponing needed public works. 
This study adds to research on subnational debt policy choices by examining a 
case where opportunistic electoral or ideological partisan debt policy cycles might be at 
work: Mexico.  Mexico’s municipalities are responsible for basic public services, 
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including public security (regular and transit police); potable water, sewage systems, and 
drainage systems; trash collection; public lighting and roads; public marketplaces, parks, 
gardens, and cemeteries; and any other services like public transportation they are able to 
fund.  Yet, it is precisely this level of government in Mexico, and in other developing 
nations, that is most at risk for opportunistic electoral or ideological partisan debt policy 
cycles due to its low administrative and professional capacity, low fiscal transparency 
and oversight, and inadequate subnational capital market framework (Cabrero and 
Carrera 2002; Cabrero Mendoza and Arellano 2011; Giugale et al. 2000a; Hernández 
Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2002; Merino 2006; Meza 2015; Sour 2004). 
Cross-sectional time-series analysis of Mexican municipal debt policy choices 
conducted on matched-case subsamples of the data – to control for other supply- and 
demand-side factors affecting subnational capital markets – shows that neither electoral 
nor partisan debt policy cycles were at work in the way expected.  All municipal leaders 
assumed lower total debt loads during election years, rather than the reverse, contrary to 
expectations.  Right-leaning parties sometimes accessed more cost-efficient loans, in line 
with ideological partisan expectations.  However, they also sometimes behaved no 
differently from their more left-leaning counterparts (in line with opportunistic electoral 
expectations).  The results suggest that debt policy dynamics are more complex than 
fiscal policy ones because they involve multidimensional decisions about total debt and 
types of loans; total debt decisions appear prey to opportunistic electoral pressures, 
whereas type of debt decisions may be subject to ideological partisan concerns.  As such, 
two theories originally deemed mutually exclusive in the fiscal policy arena may be 
complementary for debt policy choices. 
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Mexico’s Subnational Borrowing Framework 
Mexico is a federal system comprised of a Federal Districts and 31 states divided 
into 2,443 municipalities (depending on the year).  National legislation governing 
subnational debt rights and capital markets dates to reforms between 1997 and 2000.  
Subnational long-term debt liabilities must be in Mexican pesos, registered with the 
national finance secretariat (SHCP), and used for “economically productive” purposes 
(although this has been interpreted to include debt refinancing and buybacks).  Public and 
private financial institutions must assess subnational entities’ fiscal solvency or formal 
credit ratings, respectively, before authorizing loans (Auditoria Superior de la Federación 
2011; Giugale et al. 2000b; Revilla 2013).  States are responsible for outlining fiscal 
limits on state and municipal debt rights, but rarely enforce them.   
The main financing instruments in Mexico’s subnational capital market include 
public development bank loans, private commercial bank loans, and bond emissions, each 
with different associated financial costs to borrowers, the point of concern here.  (Loans 
can also be organized through third-party “trusts” but this vehicle is rarely used.) 
Public development bank loans are the most common debt instrument in Mexico, 
even if they are not the most cost-efficient to municipalities in financial terms.  The aim 
of Mexico’s public development banks is not to provide subsidized credit but to make 
financing available to entities unable to access private capital markets.  Development 
banks attach technical project and administrative (to improve fiscal management and 
transparency) assistance to their loans, passing these costs on to borrowers (Smith 2013).  
Even so, subnational entities able to access more cost-efficient private financial 
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instruments often choose development bank loans for this assistance (Smith 2013).  
Technical assistance may improve the quality public works and municipal fiscal 
administration; however, the financial cost of these loans is higher than for other types of 
debt.  Development bank loans are relatively easy to secure; the national government 
encourages their use to ensure timely completion of its national development objectives 
outlined in five-yearly plans. 
Commercial bank loans tend to be less costly than development bank loans in 
Mexico.  Although Mexico’s private commercial banks are known for their traditionally 
high interest rates and fees (Haber and Musacchio 2004; Musacchio 2012), these have 
been driven down with competition from bond emissions (Villa 2009).  Even so, 
commercial bank loans are still more costly than bond emissions because the relatively 
narrow range of lenders available in the market reduces competition among them and 
allows them to offer less favorable terms.  Moreover, commercial bank loans are released 
in tranches, allowing banks to change terms and conditions during the life of the loan.  
Even so, commercial bank loans are relatively harder to access than development bank 
loans, as they require formal credit ratings and fiscal assessments, but they are easier to 
organize than bond emissions because governments can take advantage of pre-existing 
bank relationships (Freire 2014).  Subnational governments in Mexico usually guarantee 
commercial bank loans with unearmarked transfers (Revilla 2013; Villa 2009).  
Bond emissions provide the most cost-efficient form of financing in Mexico (and 
elsewhere) but they are also the most difficult to organize (Freire 2014).  In Mexico, bond 
emissions are organized by private financial institutions that underwrite the full emission 
and remarket it to investors.  Borrowers assume fees for this service but the relatively 
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wider range of lenders (investors) available in bond markets improves their terms and 
conditions (Farvacque-Vitkovic and Kopanyi 2014; Freire 2014; Villa 2009).  Bond 
emissions are attractive because they provide immediate liquidity and enjoy terms and 
conditions that are nearly impossible to change once the issuance has occurred.  Bonds 
are usually guaranteed with unearmarked transfers (Revilla 2013; Villa 2009).  
Although there is competition between different financial institutions for 
subnational clients in Mexico, several factors undermine the fully efficient operation of 
its subnational capital market.  The history of bailouts (Hernández Trillo et al. 2002a; 
Hernández Trillo et al. 2002b) raises the expectation of future ones.  The lack of 
subnational fiscal transparency (on short-term fiscal deficits, payment arrears to service 
providers, and contingent liabilities) makes it difficult for lenders and borrowers to assess 
true borrowing capacity (Espinosa and Martell 2015; Giugale et al. 2000a; Hernández 
Trillo and Jarillo-Rabling 2002).  Scholars have thus argued that Mexico’s market-based 
framework has not worked (e.g., Giugale et al. 2000a; Hernández Trillo and Jarillo-
Rabling 2002).  Even partial market failures open the door for non-market factors to 
affect resource supply and demand.  In subnational capital markets, partial market 
failures open the door for things like electoral or partisan factors to affect debt dynamics.   
 
The Logic of Opportunistic Electoral and Ideological Partisan Debt Policy Cycles 
Three main parties dominate Mexico’s federal system: the right-leaning National 
Action Party (PAN), the centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the left-
leaning Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), a splinter from the PRI.  The PRI ruled 
Mexico in an electoral authoritarian regime for most of the 20th century, until 2000 when 
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the PAN won the presidential race.  The PAN retook the presidency in 2006 in a close 
race with the left-leaning PRD, while the centrist PRI won the 2012 presidential race in 
competitive elections. 
If Mexico’s subnational governments engage in opportunistic electoral debt policy 
cycles, then their leaders, including those from the right-leaning PAN, centrist PRI, and 
left-leaning PRD, should raise total debt loads across all financial instruments during 
election periods.  Scholars examining the effect of opportunistic electoral dynamics on 
fiscal policy choices argue that electorally opportunistic incumbents seek to create the 
illusion they have produced economic gains for constituents, leading them to raise fiscal 
expenditures during elections to strengthen this impression (Alesina et al. 1997; Drazen 
2001; Eslava 2011; Franzese 2002; Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1975, 1978).  If this is the case, 
then electorally opportunistic incumbents should raise long-term debt loads during 
election periods as well, with their drive to increase public spending for electoral ends 
also leading them to disregard the difference financial costs of loans.  That is: 
 
Opportunistic Electoral Debt Policy Cycle Hypothesis: If subnational leaders engage in 
opportunistic electoral policy cycles, then all parties will raise total debt loads across all 
types of debt instruments. 
 
If opportunistic electoral policy cycles drive debt policy decisions in Mexico, then the 
PAN, PRI, and PRD should each ramp up subnational debt loads across all types of 
financial instruments during election periods, without regard to the relative costs of loans.   
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If Mexico’s subnational governments follow an ideological partisan debt policy 
cycle logic, then governments run by left-leaning parties like the PRD should assume 
greater debt loads during elections balanced toward instruments with less cost-efficient 
terms because these instruments are easier to access.  Governments run by right-leaning 
parties like the PAN should assume lower debt loads during election cycles and balance 
this debt toward more cost-efficient instruments, with these instruments comparatively 
more difficult to access.  Basing their arguments on “rational partisan” theory (Garrett 
1998; Hibbs 1987), scholars examining fiscal policy for ideological partisan cycles argue 
that left-leaning parties – whose working class and poorer constituents prioritize 
immediate-term public spending for job creation and economic growth – will engage in 
expansionary fiscal spending during elections (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Franzese 
2002; Garrett 1998; Hibbs 1987; Tufte 1978).  Right-leaning parties – whose middle and 
upper class voters prioritize macroeconomic stability for job creation and economic 
growth – will engage in contractionary fiscal spending during elections (Alesina and 
Rosenthal 1995; Franzese 2002; Garrett 1998; Hibbs 1987; Tufte 1978).  Ideologically-
oriented parties time their expansionary or contractionary policies around election periods 
to maximize their electoral effect (Franzese 2002; Tufte 1978).   
If ideological partisan policy cycles affect debt policy choices, then left-leaning 
incumbents should be driven to contract larger debt loads but also to access costlier debt 
instruments because these instruments are easier and quicker to access.  Left-leaning 
parties’ constituents value immediate public spending for job creation and economic 
growth.  In contrast, right-leaning incumbents should assume lower debt loads and use 
more cost-efficient debt instruments that are relatively harder to access.  Their 
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constituents value macroeconomic stability for job creation and economic growth, 
leading them to take their time when considering among different loans.  That is: 
 
Ideological Partisan Debt Policy Cycle Hypothesis: If parties engage in ideological 
partisan debt policy cycles, then left-leaning parties will assume greater total debt using 
less cost-efficient instruments during elections, while right-leaning parties will assume 
lower total debt using more cost-efficient instruments during elections. 
 
If ideological partisan debt policy cycles drive debt decisions in Mexico, then the left-
leaning PRD should assume higher debt loads balanced toward less cost-efficient 
instruments during election periods.  The right-leaning PAN should assume lower debt 
loads balanced toward more cost-efficient debt during election periods.  The PRI’s debt 
policy choices should lie in between these two extremes.  
Any findings in favor of the opportunistic electoral debt policy cycle logic would 
eliminate the possibility of the ideological partisan one, while any findings in favor of the 
ideological partisan debt policy cycle logic would eliminate the possibility of the 
opportunistic electoral one.  Also, any findings that electorally-driven subnational leaders 
did not distinguish between election and non-election years in their debt policy choices 
– that is, against the opportunistic electoral cycle logic and in favor of its null hypothesis 
– would imply an alternative logic at work: that all politicians seek office with the 
altruistic policy aim of overseeing public policy provision, without thought to timing it to 
maximize future electoral rewards.  And, any findings that ideologically-driven 
subnational leaders did not distinguish between election and non-election years in their 
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debt policy choices – that is, against the ideological partisan debt cycle logic and in favor 
of its null hypothesis – would imply an alternative logic at work as well: that partisan 
politicians seek office with “rational partisan” policy aims of implementing debt policy in 
line with their constituents’ preferences, without thought to timing policy measures to 
maximize future electoral rewards.  Finally, any findings against both the opportunistic 
electoral and the ideological partisan logic at once would mean that neither electoral nor 
partisan factors affected capital markets in Mexico and that something entirely different 
was at work. 
 
Mexico’s Municipal Debt Data, Methodological Concerns, and Statistical Strategy 
To distinguish the presence of opportunistic electoral or ideological partisan debt 
policy cycles, a panel dataset of debt policy choices in municipal Mexico was 
constructed.  The dataset begins in 2005, the first year the nation’s finance ministry began 
to record subnational debt data, and ends in 2012, the last year for which there is 
complete data on all variables needed for the analysis.  The database excludes the Federal 
District; its lower-level delegations do not enjoy the same debt rights as municipalities.  
The database includes all 31 states, even Oaxaca which holds nonpartisan elections in 
most municipalities.  Parties operate in Oaxaca’s nominally nonpartisan municipalities, 
with municipal leaders delivering partisan-based support in state and federal elections 
(Benton 2012), so state elections serve as a proxy.   
The database is limited to municipalities under control of one of the main PRI, 
PAN, or PRD parties.  When identifying PRI, PAN, and PRD municipalities, coalitions 
between these parties and small ones were coded as falling under the main party label.  
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Coalitions between the PAN and PRD were excluded, as were coalitions between small 
parties; it is difficult to predict their ideological views.  Pairing down the sample to those 
municipalities under PAN, PRI, and PRI rule produced 16,728 total municipal-year 
observations during the 2005-2012 period.  Of these total municipal-year observations, 
there were 3,720 under PAN rule, 10,726 under PRI rule, and 2,255 under PRD rule, and 
a total of 5,025 elections among them (data are from state electoral institutes and the 
Center for Research on Development CIDAC). 
There were 5,949 loans among all municipal-year observations during this period, 
including 4,163 development bank loans, 790 commercial bank loans, 80 bond emissions, 
139 trust instruments (not analyzed), 49 “other” unspecified credits (not analyzed).  5,024 
municipal-year observations had loans, 11,704 did not.  Municipal-year observations with 
zero loans must be included in the analysis, in order to consider the full range of debt 
policy choices – including contractionary ones – in any year.  Mean total debt among the 
municipal-year observations averaged 90.40 pesos per capita (standard deviation 
1,423.48), mean development bank debt averaged 53.72 pesos per capita (standard 
deviation 147.53), mean commercial bank debt averaged 29.00 pesos per capita (standard 
deviation 1,413.62), and mean bond debt averaged 6.50 pesos per capita (standard 
deviation 68.13).  Debt data are from the SHCP.  All data is in 2005 pesos. 
Comparing parties’ long-term debt decisions is complicated by several factors that 
affect municipal access to – and interest in accessing – subnational capital markets.  On 
the supply side, municipal creditworthiness shapes debt access.  However, Mexico’s 
more creditworthy municipalities have been the most fertile ground for the right-leaning 
PAN to challenge the formerly dominant PRI, while its less creditworthy municipalities 
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have been the most fertile ground for the left-leaning PRD to challenge the PRI.  Direct 
comparison of all PAN to all PRI municipalities would thus compare wealthier PAN 
municipalities to all PRI municipalities, including less creditworthy ones.  Direct 
comparison of all PRD to all PRI municipalities would compare poorer PRD 
municipalities to all PRI municipalities, including more creditworthy ones.  Direct 
comparison of PAN and PRD debt behavior would compare generally 
wealthier/creditworthy PAN municipalities to generally poorer/less creditworthy PRD 
ones.  These are inappropriate comparisons: any differences observed between parties 
may not be the product of different ideological partisan debt policies but the product of 
underlying differences in creditworthiness.   
On the demand-side, federal fiscal contracts that create vertical fiscal imbalances 
(especially if lacking hard budget constraints) encourage subnational leaders to overspend 
(Rodden 2006).  In Mexico, states and municipalities are known for de jure vertical fiscal 
imbalances (Díaz-Cayeros 2006) and for de facto soft budget constraints (Giugale et al. 
2000a).  States finance municipalities through the redistribution of a set share of their 
unearmarked federal fiscal transfers, with each state setting its own criteria, which is 
often politically manipulated (Timmons and Broid 2013).   
To address these supply- and demand- factors affecting subnational capital 
markets in Mexico (and elsewhere), the statistical analysis was conducted on matched 
subsamples of the data.  To do this, three unmatched samples of all PRD-run and all PRI-
run municipalities, all PAN-run and all PRI-run municipalities, and all PAN-run and all 
PRD-run municipalities were constructed.  Then coarsened exact matching (CEM) (Iacus 
et al. 2012)1 was used to match PAN and PRI, PAN and PRD, and PRD and PRI 
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municipalities according to their supply-side creditworthiness – municipal population 
size (square root), total municipal fiscal revenues (own source revenues and transfer 
revenues; square root per capita), and human development (Mexico’s marginality index) 
(see Chapman 2008; Freire 2014; Thau 2011) – and their demand-side structural 
incentives – vertical fiscal imbalances (own source revenues / total revenues) – to take 
out debt (data are from the nation’s census bureau INEGI and National Population 
Council CONAPO).  The human development (marginality) index also controls for the 
state of public services and thus the need for public works.  Population size and human 
development may also affect municipal debt demand through administrative capacity 
(Avellaneda 2009b; Meza 2015; O'Toole and Meier 1999), while own source revenues 
compared to total revenues sometimes measure administrative capacity (e.g., Cabrero 
Mendoza 2004; Ibarra Salazar et al. 2001). 
It is inappropriate to match municipalities according to their credit ratings, loan 
interest rates, or loan maturities because this would lead many observations to drop out of 
the samples, introducing selection bias into the results.  Only those municipalities 
accessing private sector credit sought formal ratings, with those accessing only 
development bank loans dropping out of the models; this would bias the results against 
the opportunistic election hypothesis.  Only those municipalities taking loans would have 
associated interest rates or maturities, with all zero debt observations dropping out of the 
models; this would bias the results against the ideological partisan hypothesis.   
The impact of electoral and partisan policy cycles on municipal debt decisions 
was then assessed on each matched subsample using linear (Prais-Winston) cross-
sectional time-series regression with panel corrected standard errors (CSTS-PCSE).  
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Total and types of debt were separately regressed on the party variables, a municipal 
election year dummy, a variable capturing vertical partisan alignment between mayors 
and state governors [in the case that this improves fiscal discipline, as argued by Jones et 
al. (2000); Rodden and Wibbels (2002)], and the variables used in the matching process 
(to control for any lingering differences after matching) for each matched subsample.  
The choice of CSTS-PCSE was made due to heteroskedacticity and autocorrelation found 
present in the errors.2  We run all models on the data in level form.3  The CSTS-PCSE 
model’s panel (municipal) correction precludes the need for panel (municipal) fixed 
effects.4  Even so, the inclusion of municipal fixed effects would not be appropriate given 
that the partisan dummy variables do not vary much over time in most municipalities, and 
many of the controls are highly sluggish (see Clark and Linzer 2015).  Also, the study 
focuses on differences between rather than within municipalities. 
For all analyses, yearly peso-denominated municipal debt data was transformed 
into per capita square roots to reduce the impact of outliers and address nonlinearity 
(recall, all debt data is from SHCP).  (The standard transformation of fiscal data is to take 
the natural log but the presence of zero debt values leads us to use a square root 
transformation instead.)  Year fixed effects (dummies) control for inter-temporal 
variation.5  They also control for shifting subnational need for financing and investor 
appetite for subsovereign debt.  The 2008 dummy was excluded to create a pre- and post-
global financial crisis comparison.  The models do not include state fixed-effects.  
Despite the presence of formal rules limiting subnational debt in some states, incoming 
mayors are regularly surprised by the liabilities left by prior administrations, 
demonstrating that state rules are not enforced and that there is little oversight over 
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municipal fiscal and debt decisions (e.g., Cabrero and Carrera 2002; Cabrero Mendoza 
and Arellano 2011; Giugale et al. 2000a; Merino 2006). 
 
Assessing Support for Electoral or Partisan Policy Cycles in Mexico 
The presentation of the statistical results begins with the matched PAN–PRI 
subsample, followed by the PRD–PRI subsample, and then the PAN–PRD subsample.  In 
all models, a partisan dummy (“Party” Municipality), an election year dummy (Municipal 
Election Year), and an interaction between the two (“Party” Municipality * Muni 
Election) are used to distinguish the presence of opportunistic electoral or ideological 
partisan debt policy cycles.  For ease of interpretation, results for linear combinations of 
these estimators are discussed instead of the main regression models. 
 
The PAN–PRI Comparison 
Table 1 presents results for the CSTS-PCSE models for the matched PAN–PRI 
subsample.  Linear combinations of the main explanatory variables and their interaction 
term estimators are in Table 2.  Table 3 presents a summary of the theoretical 
expectations and the empirical findings.  The opportunistic electoral debt policy cycle 
logic predicts that both parties will ramp up total debt during election cycles but that they 
will behave no differently across different types of loans.  The ideological partisan debt 
policy cycle logic predicts that left-leaning parties will assume greater total and more 
expensive debt during elections cycles and that right-leaning parties will assume lower 
total debt balanced toward less costly instruments during elections. 
–Table 1 About Here– 
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–Table 2 About Here– 
–Table 3 About Here– 
The results in Table 2 and Table 3 show that neither the PAN nor the PRI entirely 
conformed to either theoretical view.  Beginning with total debt, the linear combination 
of the estimator for PRI municipalities during election years was negative and significant 
(-0.834), showing that PRI municipalities assumed less total per capita debt (square root) 
during election- compared to non-election years (the omitted case).  The linear 
combination of the estimator for PAN municipalities during election years was also 
negative and significant (-0.838), showing that PAN municipalities assumed lower total 
per capita debt (square root) than both the PRI (the omitted case) and the PAN in non-
election years [the combination of the estimate for PAN municipalities during non-
election years (-0.073) was not significant and thus not different from the PRI in non-
election years].  Although the linear combinations of the estimates for PRI (-0.834) and 
PAN municipalities in election years (-0.838) are negative and significant, and thus 
significantly different from PRI and PAN municipalities in non-election years, the 
confidence intervals around these two estimates overlap, showing that they are not 
significantly different from one another.  Although the opportunistic electoral cycle 
theory predicted no difference between parties in total debt acquisition, as is found to be 
the case here, it also predicted that parties would spend more, not less, during elections, 
contrary to the findings.6   
Table 2 provides the squared linear combinations of the estimates to show the 
explanatory variables’ substantive effects.  The per capita debt figures are square roots, 
so the impact of the linear combinations of the dummy variables on the dependent 
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variable is equivalent to their squared coefficients.  While PAN municipalities behaved 
no differently from PRI ones, together they behaved differently in election compared to 
non-election years.  PRI municipalities enjoyed 0.697 lower and PAN municipalities 
0.702 lower yearly peso per capita debt in election compared to non-election years.  
While seemingly a small effect, when aggregated over entire municipal populations and 
summed over multiple years, this effect becomes quite large. 
Turning to development bank loans, Table 2 shows that the PAN and PRI both 
contracted less per capita development bank debt (square root) during election years and 
that they behaved no differently from one another in this regard.  However, given that the 
national government pushes subnational governments toward development bank loans, as 
note above, these loans should mainly be examined for the presence opportunistic 
electoral cycles and not ideological partisan ones.  The estimate for PRI municipalities in 
election years (-0.931) was negative and significant, with the party contracting less per 
capita development bank debt in election compared to non-election years (the omitted 
case).  The estimate for PAN municipalities during election years was also negative and 
significant (-1.078), showing that the PAN also contracted less development bank debt 
than the PRI (the omitted case) and the PAN in non-election years [the estimate for PAN 
municipalities in non-election years (-0.001) was not significant].  The overlap in the 
confidence interval around the estimate for the linear combination of the PAN’s (-1.078) 
and PRI’s (-0.931) election year development bank debt shows they behaved no 
differently from one another.  These findings are contrary to both opportunistic electoral 
and ideological partisan expectations.  Substantive effects are in Table 2.   
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Concluding with the private sector debt instruments, Table 2 shows that both 
PAN and PRI municipalities did not distinguish between election and non-election years 
in their commercial bank loans, contrary to both hypotheses.  The estimate for the PRI’s 
election year commercial bank behavior (-0.119) was not significantly different from the 
omitted non-election year PRI, while the confidence intervals around the estimate for the 
PAN’s non-election year (-0.275) and election year (-0.367) per capita commercial bank 
debt overlap.  However, the statistically significant estimates for the PAN’s commercial 
bank loan acquisition in both non-election and election years show that the PAN took out 
systematically less commercial bank debt than the PRI, in line with the presence of 
ideological partisan effects.  In contrast, the PRI and PAN took out higher bond debt in 
election compared to non-election years (shown by the positive and significant values of 
their respective 0.129 and 0.521 coefficients), while the PAN took out significantly 
greater bond debt than the PRI, in both election and non-election years, also in line with 
ideological partisan expectations. 
Taken together the results for the PAN–PRI subsample do not provide clear 
support for either the opportunistic electoral or the ideological partisan hypotheses.  
However, the results also do not provide clear support for either logic’s null hypothesis 
either, nor for the global null hypothesis that there are no political effects of any kind.  
Instead, there appears to be some kind of electoral and partisan effect at work, but not in 
the way originally expected under the opportunistic electoral or ideological partisan 
views.  This is discussed further below. 
 
The PRD–PRI Comparison 
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Table 4 presents results for the CSTS-PCSE analysis conducted on the matched 
PRD–PRI subsample.  Table 2 and Table 3 show that similarly creditworthy PRD and 
PRI municipalities acquired less total debt in election compared to non-election years, 
and that these parties behaved no differently from each another within these different 
time periods, as found in the PAN–PRI comparison above.  Table 2 also shows that PRD 
and PRI municipalities contracted lower development bank debt in election compared to 
non-election years, and that they behaved no differently from one other in this regard as 
well, also in line with the PAN–PRI analysis.  These findings are contrary to the 
opportunistic electoral and the ideological partisan debt cycle logics.  
–Table 4 About Here– 
Moreover, the PRD and PRI municipalities also assumed greater commercial 
bank debt in non-election rather election years, with these parties showing no difference 
between each other in this tendency, as found in the PAN–PRI matched sample and 
contrary to both hypotheses.  In line with opportunistic electoral expectations, however, 
PRD and PRI municipalities tended to access bond market debt at greater rates during 
election years.  However, the left-leaning PRD assumed greater, rather than lower, cost-
efficient bond debt compared to the more centrist PRI, demonstrating the presence of a 
partisan difference, contrary to the opportunistic electoral logic, but one that is also 
contrary to ideological partisan logic as well. 
The results for the PRD-PRI comparison thus do not provide clear support for the 
opportunistic electoral or the ideological partisan logics either, nor do they confirm these 
logic’s null hypotheses (or the global null hypothesis of no political effects).  Instead, 
there appears to be partial support for each of the opportunistic electoral and ideological 
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partisan hypotheses, suggesting that debt policy dynamics may be different from fiscal 
policy ones.  The study elaborates on this below.   
 
The PAN–PRD Comparison 
The results for the CSTS-PCSE analysis conducted on the matched PAN–PRD 
subsample are in Table 5.  As above, Table 2 and Table 3 show that both PAN and PRD 
municipalities acquired lower total per capita debt during election compared to non-
election years.  However, in contrast to the comparisons above, the PAN’s total per capita 
debt in non-election years was greater than that of the PRD, contrary to the opportunistic 
electoral hypothesis but also contrary to the ideological partisan logic as well; the right-
leaning PAN assumed greater, not lower, total debt compared to the left-leaning PRD.  
As is also the case with the subsamples above, PAN and PRD municipalities contracted 
similarly lower development bank debt in election years compared to non-election ones.  
However, the PAN’s non-election year development bank debt was greater than that of 
the PRD, contrary to the logics of both theories.   
–Table 5 About Here– 
Turning to private sector financial instruments, the PRD displayed no election 
year preference for commercial bank loans, whereas the PAN sought lower – rather than 
higher – commercial bank debt during electoral periods, contrary to the opportunistic 
electoral debt policy logic.  However, the parties behaved in line with ideological partisan 
expectations in terms of their relative preference for commercial bank debt, with the left-
leaning PRD favoring this costly instrument compared to the more right-leaning PAN.  
However, both parties accessed bond markets at higher rates during elections but 
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displayed no difference in their relative partisan preferences for this type of debt, contrary 
to the ideological partisan theory but in line with the opportunistic electoral model.  
As above, these results do not provide clear support for either the opportunistic 
electoral or the ideological partisan hypotheses, but they also do not lead to the clear 
acceptance of either null hypothesis either (nor the global null hypothesis).  There is, 
instead, partial support for each hypothesis, suggesting that multi-year, multi-instrument 
debt policy decisions operate differently from annual fiscal policy choices.  The 
following section addresses this point. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
At first glance, the statistical results suggest that Mexico’s PAN, PRI, and PRD 
did not engage in opportunistic electoral or ideological partisan debt policy cycles.  
However, at second glance, the results do not provide unequivocal support for their null 
hypotheses either.  Instead, there appears to be partial support for the argument that 
election cycles matter, because all parties raised total spending ahead of elections.  Table 
3 shows that nearly all matched-party comparisons produced different election and non-
election year behavior across both total debt as well as across different instruments.  
Municipal leaders begin most public works projects well ahead of elections to ensure that 
they enjoy the political benefits of these expenditures rather than incoming 
administrations.  For this reason, debt policy choices, precisely because they regard 
multi-year capital investment plans, are timed ahead of elections, rather than during them.   
There also appears to be partial support for the proposition that parties behave in 
different ways, although both ideological as well as historical partisan considerations may 
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drive these differences.  Table 3 shows that the relatively more right-leaning PAN tended 
to assume lower costly commercial bank debt compared to the centrist PRI and left-
leaning PRD, as well as sometimes assumed greater and cheaper bond debt compared to 
the PRI.  However, comparison of the centrist PRI to its left-leaning splinter PRD did not 
produce expected ideological partisan differences in these parties’ relative debt behavior.  
Party history appears to account for this result: PRI leaders have enjoyed traditionally 
cozy relations with the nation’s private commercial banking sector (Hernández Trillo et 
al. 2002a; Hernández Trillo et al. 2002b), encouraging its leaders to stick with these loans 
and pushing its opposition splinter PRD to access cheaper bonds instead.   
Cross-national studies show that national governments tend to follow ideological 
partisan rather than opportunistic electoral fiscal policy cycles (Drazen 2001; Eslava 
2011; Franzese 2002).  Individual country case studies suggest that subnational 
governments in developing nations tend to follow opportunistic electoral fiscal policy 
cycles instead of ideological partisan ones (e.g., Drazen and Eslava 2010; Jones et al. 
2012; Letelier S. 2011; Sáez 2016; Sakurai and Menezes-Filho 2008; Veiga and Veiga 
2007).  Examination of debt policy dynamics in Mexico produces different results 
contrary to both.  Unlike in the case of fiscal policy decisions, the opportunistic electoral 
and ideological partisan logics may not provide mutually exclusive rationales for debt 
policy choices, because debt policy involves decisions on multiple dimensions, 
something not too surprising given research on budgetary allocations for debt payments 
(e.g., Sáez 2016).   
Electoral opportunism may drive parties to raise total debt acquisition – albeit 
ahead of elections – in order to raise their chances of winning.  Parties may couple this 
 23 
with an “ideological partisan” bent when choosing among types of debt instruments, with 
these choices driven by partisan (or historic) rationales.  Indeed, different types of debt 
may also require different time horizons.  Table 3 shows that development bank and 
commercial bank debt were concentrated in non-election years, whereas bonds were 
assumed at greater rates during election periods.  Loans released in tranches, during the 
course of the delivery of the public project, may be concentrated earlier in subnational 
leaders’ administrations in order to maximize their political benefits.  Loans that provide 
immediate liquidity may be timed closer to elections. 
Any deficiencies in subnational capital market frameworks would only serve to 
aggravate the opportunistic electoral and ideological partisan dynamics found here.  
Central governments determining the debt rights of federal or decentralized subnational 
entities, as well as the frameworks granting them access to subnational capital markets, 
should be aware that subnational governments may be driven toward opportunistic 
electoral and ideological partisan behavior when deciding the total and type of debt to be 
assumed.  Overly burdensome debt loads and overly costly debt financing raise pressure 
on subnational fiscal finances, something that can undermine national macroeconomic 
stability (Dillinger and Webb 1999; Giugale et al. 2000a; Heller 2005; Sáez 2016).  So, 
any rules that can be embedded in regulatory frameworks aimed at reducing the incentive 
to engage in electoral- and partisan-oriented decisions will work to the benefit of local 
fiscal finances and nation macroeconomic stability down the line.  
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Endnotes
1 T-tests on covariate means across parties after matching were insignificant. 
2 Woolridge tests for serial autocorrelation of group-wise disturbances were significant (p 
< 0.01) across GLS - FE models.  Wald tests for group-wise (within municipal unit) 
heteroskedasticity were significant (p < 0.01) across GLS - FE models.  
3 Unit-root tests – Levin-Lin-Chu, Harris-Tzavalis, and Breitung tests – show that we can 
reject the null hypothesis of the presence of unit roots (p < 0.01). 
4 Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier tests on GLS - FE models rejected the null 
hypothesis that the unit-specific residuals are zero (p<0.01) for all measures of the 
dependent variable used here), so there is variance across the units (municipalities) 
beyond that explained by FE models and thus that RE models are appropriate.  
5 Tests for whether year dummies are jointly equal to zero reject the null hypothesis that 
they are (with p < 0.01).  
6 Analyses of the impact of non-election year dummies produce the same results but 
complicate their interpretation, so standard election-year dummy was used.  
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Table 1: Matched PAN–PRI Sample, Electoral Opportunism, Ideological Partisanship, and 
Debt in Mexico 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt 
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt 
PAN Municipality (Dummy) -0.0728 -0.000849 -0.275* 0.353*** 
 (0.234) (0.201) (0.158) (0.0408) 
Municipal Election Year (Dummy) -0.834*** -0.931*** -0.119 0.129*** 
 (0.149) (0.103) (0.121) (0.0263) 
PAN Municipality * Muni Election 0.0692 -0.146 0.0269 0.0388 
 (0.260) (0.179) (0.210) (0.0481) 
Copartisan State Governor 0.143 0.0999 0.186 -0.0967** 
 (0.216) (0.185) (0.141) (0.0454) 
Total Population (sqrt) 0.0174*** 0.00617*** 0.0131*** 0.000116 
 (0.00130) (0.00119) (0.00120) (0.000443) 
Fiscal Revenue (per cap sqrt) -0.00188 0.00118 0.0113 -0.0107*** 
 (0.0196) (0.00688) (0.0185) (0.00200) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance -3.408*** -3.608*** 0.339 -0.121 
 (0.866) (0.557) (0.707) (0.159) 
Human Dev. (Marginality Index) -0.451** -0.518*** -0.160 0.270*** 
 (0.207) (0.133) (0.147) (0.0939) 
Year Dummy 2005 -0.784** -0.438** -0.161 -0.110 
 (0.333) (0.199) (0.275) (0.0777) 
Year Dummy 2006 0.454* 0.674*** -0.0643 -0.0170 
 (0.274) (0.177) (0.221) (0.0630) 
Year Dummy 2007 0.578** 0.654*** 0.0897 -0.0917** 
 (0.237) (0.147) (0.199) (0.0432) 
Year Dummy 2008 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
     
Year Dummy 2009 2.821*** 2.159*** 0.422*** 0.595*** 
 (0.183) (0.132) (0.140) (0.0424) 
Year Dummy 2010 3.769*** 2.132*** 0.594*** 1.404*** 
 (0.269) (0.181) (0.215) (0.0590) 
Year Dummy 2011 3.591*** 2.446*** 0.397* 1.419*** 
 (0.303) (0.203) (0.240) (0.0668) 
Year Dummy 2012 3.007*** 1.484*** 0.690*** 1.414*** 
 (0.328) (0.218) (0.261) (0.0734) 
Constant 3.588** 4.738*** -2.240* 0.528** 
 (1.474) (0.760) (1.316) (0.242) 
Number Observations 10385 10385 10385 10385 
Number Groups 1826 1826 1826 1826 
R2 0.0460 0.0581 0.0192 0.0524 
Chi-2 914.7*** 709.3*** 198.9*** 729.9*** 
Note: Linear (Prais-Winston) cross-sectional time-series regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors (in parentheses), with heteroskedastic and AR1 error corrections.  * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 2: Linear Combinations of Estimators for Election Year, Partisanship, and 
Interaction Term Dummies 
Party 
Election 
Year 
Coefficient 
Squared Coefficient Std. Error P-Value CI-LB CI-UB 
PAN-PRI Matched Subsample     
Total Debt 
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes -0.696 -0.834 0.149 0.000 -1.126 -0.542 
PAN No -0.005 -0.073 0.234 0.756 -0.532 0.386 
PAN Yes -0.702 -0.838 0.246 0.001 -1.319 -0.356 
        
Development Bank Debt 
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes -0.867 -0.931 0.103 0.000 -1.133 -0.730 
PAN No -1.000E-06 -0.001 0.201 0.997 -0.395 0.393 
PAN Yes -1.162 -1.078 0.210 0.000 -1.489 -0.667 
        
Commercial Bank Debt 
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes -0.014 -0.119 0.121 0.326 -0.356 0.118 
PAN No -0.076 -0.275 0.158 0.081 -0.584 0.034 
PAN Yes -0.135 -0.367 0.170 0.031 -0.700 -0.034 
        
Bond Debt        
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes 0.017 0.129 0.026 0.000 0.077 0.181 
PAN No 0.125 0.353 0.041 0.000 0.273 0.433 
PAN Yes 0.271 0.521 0.040 0.000 0.443 0.598 
        
PRD-PRI Matched Subsample     
Total Debt        
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes -1.235 -1.111 0.111 0.000 -1.329 -0.893 
PRD No -0.099 -0.315 0.199 0.114 -0.706 0.076 
PRD Yes -0.819 -0.905 0.215 0.000 -1.327 -0.483 
        
Development Bank Debt 
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes -1.466 -1.211 0.107 0.000 -1.421 -1.001 
PRD No -0.211 -0.460 0.188 0.014 -0.828 -0.091 
PRD Yes -1.501 -1.225 0.202 0.000 -1.621 -0.829 
        
Commercial Bank Debt 
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes -0.014 -0.119 0.052 0.023 -0.221 -0.017 
PRD No -0.017 -0.132 0.097 0.173 -0.321 0.058 
PRD Yes -0.044 -0.210 0.112 0.061 -0.430 0.010 
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Bond Debt        
PRI No omitted category     
PRI Yes 0.007 0.086 0.027 0.001 0.033 0.139 
PRD No 0.061 0.247 0.048 0.000 0.153 0.341 
PRD Yes 0.143 0.378 0.049 0.000 0.281 0.474 
        
PAN-PRD Matched Subsample 
Total Debt        
PRD No omitted category     
PRD Yes -0.269 -0.519 0.215 0.016 -0.941 -0.098 
PAN No 0.356 0.597 0.313 0.056 -0.016 1.209 
PAN Yes -0.089 -0.298 0.320 0.351 -0.926 0.329 
        
Development Bank Debt 
PRD No omitted category     
PRD Yes -0.512 -0.716 0.211 0.001 -1.128 -0.303 
PAN No 0.475 0.689 0.286 0.016 0.129 1.249 
PAN Yes -0.178 -0.422 0.297 0.156 -1.004 0.161 
        
Commercial Bank Debt 
PRD No omitted category     
PRD Yes -0.019 -0.138 0.099 0.165 -0.332 0.057 
PAN No -0.002 -0.042 0.153 0.783 -0.342 0.258 
PAN Yes -0.080 -0.282 0.158 0.075 -0.592 0.028 
        
Bond Debt        
PRD No omitted category     
PRD Yes 0.061 0.248 0.056 0.000 0.138 0.358 
PAN No 0.015 0.124 0.121 0.308 -0.114 0.362 
PAN Yes 0.105 0.324 0.121 0.007 0.087 0.560 
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Table 3: Theoretical Expectations and Summary Empirical Results 
  
  
THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS SUMMARY EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
  
  
Opportunistic 
Electoral Logic 
Ideological  
Partisan Logic 
PRD–PRI 
Matched Sample 
PAN–PRI 
Matched Sample 
PAN–PRD 
Matched Sample 
 
Relative Placement Relative Placement 
Left-
Leaning 
PRD 
Centrist 
PRI 
Centrist  
PRI 
Right-
Leaning 
PAN 
Left-
Leaning 
PRD 
Right-
Leaning  
PAN 
Variable Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right Left Right 
Total Debt           
Election Period 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
           
Partisan Policy 
No No Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
No No No No No Yes 
(Higher) 
Development Bank           
Election Period 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
           
Partisan Policy 
No No Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
No No No No No Yes 
(Higher) 
Commercial Bank           
Election Period 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
No No No Yes 
(Lower) 
           
Partisan Policy 
No No Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
No No Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Bonds           
Election Period 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
           
Partisan Policy 
No No Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Lower) 
Yes 
(Higher) 
No No 
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Table 4: Matched PRD–PRI Sample, Electoral Opportunism, Ideological Partisanship, and 
Debt in Mexico 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt 
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt 
PRD Municipality (Dummy) -0.315 -0.460** -0.132 0.247*** 
 (0.199) (0.188) (0.0966) (0.0477) 
Municipal Election Year (Dummy) -1.111*** -1.211*** -0.119** 0.0861*** 
 (0.111) (0.107) (0.0523) (0.0269) 
PRD Municipality * Muni Election 0.521** 0.445** 0.0406 0.0446 
 (0.216) (0.206) (0.104) (0.0589) 
Copartisan State Governor 0.113 0.0334 0.153** -0.0569 
 (0.156) (0.149) (0.0679) (0.0355) 
Total Population (sqrt) 0.0157*** 0.0117*** 0.00533*** -0.000112 
 (0.00137) (0.00114) (0.00112) (0.000430) 
Fiscal Revenue (per cap sqrt) 0.00508 0.0151* 0.00316 -0.0133*** 
 (0.00819) (0.00790) (0.00288) (0.00207) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance -2.106*** -2.117*** -0.181 0.0514 
 (0.557) (0.542) (0.213) (0.166) 
Human Dev. (Marginality Index) -0.561*** -0.528*** -0.177*** 0.155** 
 (0.135) (0.117) (0.0603) (0.0772) 
Year Dummy 2005 -0.332 -0.106 -0.0862 -0.108 
 (0.216) (0.200) (0.0903) (0.0828) 
Year Dummy 2006 0.475** 0.538*** -0.0475 0.0390 
 (0.189) (0.177) (0.0811) (0.0662) 
Year Dummy 2007 0.758*** 0.818*** 0.0825 -0.0570 
 (0.157) (0.150) (0.0709) (0.0474) 
Year Dummy 2008 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
     
Year Dummy 2009 2.475*** 1.976*** 0.151*** 0.683*** 
 (0.136) (0.132) (0.0527) (0.0455) 
Year Dummy 2010 3.483*** 2.346*** 0.325*** 1.220*** 
 (0.200) (0.190) (0.0882) (0.0666) 
Year Dummy 2011 3.030*** 2.002*** 0.392*** 1.209*** 
 (0.222) (0.211) (0.0987) (0.0725) 
Year Dummy 2012 2.081*** 0.924*** 0.402*** 1.194*** 
 (0.236) (0.225) (0.106) (0.0771) 
Constant 2.167*** 2.066*** -0.479 0.528** 
 (0.810) (0.770) (0.338) (0.243) 
Number Observations 8453 8453 8453 8453 
Number Groups 1695 1695 1695 1695 
R2 Within 0.0793 0.0709 0.0163 0.0365 
Chi-2 846.3*** 690.8*** 70.85*** 498.8*** 
Note: Linear (Prais-Winston) cross-sectional time-series regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors (in parentheses), with heteroskedastic and AR1 error corrections.  * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Matched PAN–PRD Sample, Electoral Opportunism, Ideological Partisanship, 
and Debt in Mexico 
 Total Debt 
Development 
Bank Debt 
Commercial 
Bank Debt Bond Debt 
PAN Municipality (Dummy) 0.597* 0.689** -0.0420 0.124 
 (0.313) (0.286) (0.153) (0.121) 
Municipal Election Year (Dummy) -0.519** -0.716*** -0.138 0.248*** 
 (0.215) (0.211) (0.0992) (0.0561) 
PAN Municipality * Muni Election -0.376 -0.395 -0.102 -0.0479 
 (0.273) (0.274) (0.120) (0.0773) 
Copartisan State Governor -0.501 0.121 -0.130 -0.507*** 
 (0.450) (0.404) (0.164) (0.117) 
Total Population (sqrt) 0.0157*** 0.0117*** 0.00618*** -0.000360 
 (0.00243) (0.00217) (0.00141) (0.000769) 
Fiscal Revenue (per cap sqrt) 0.00631 0.0241* 0.0117*** -0.0273*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0142) (0.00434) (0.00431) 
Vertical Fiscal Imbalance -4.285*** -4.391*** -0.0242 -0.254 
 (1.069) (1.063) (0.493) (0.311) 
Human Dev. (Marginality Index) 0.00540 -0.287 -0.144** 0.545*** 
 (0.205) (0.190) (0.0677) (0.0749) 
Year Dummy 2005 -0.811** -0.197 -0.0239 -0.510*** 
 (0.318) (0.308) (0.116) (0.0872) 
Year Dummy 2006 0.500* 1.082*** -0.0521 -0.429*** 
 (0.283) (0.278) (0.106) (0.0708) 
Year Dummy 2007 0.611*** 0.856*** 0.134 -0.291*** 
 (0.220) (0.220) (0.0855) (0.0495) 
Year Dummy 2008 omitted omitted omitted omitted 
     
Year Dummy 2009 2.525*** 2.119*** 0.0306 0.593*** 
 (0.224) (0.227) (0.0704) (0.0562) 
Year Dummy 2010 4.093*** 2.425*** 0.362*** 1.499*** 
 (0.312) (0.310) (0.123) (0.0844) 
Year Dummy 2011 3.863*** 2.729*** 0.319** 1.535*** 
 (0.341) (0.334) (0.139) (0.113) 
Year Dummy 2012 2.997*** 1.433*** 0.555*** 1.647*** 
 (0.361) (0.348) (0.148) (0.141) 
Constant 4.069*** 3.080** -1.095* 2.066*** 
 (1.479) (1.427) (0.622) (0.505) 
Number Observations 4087 4087 4087 4087 
Number Groups 1090 1090 1090 1090 
R2 Within 0.0753 0.0550 0.0261 0.103 
Chi-2 421.2*** 312.6*** 54.24*** 466.9*** 
Note: Linear (Prais-Winston) cross-sectional time-series regression with panel-corrected 
standard errors (in parentheses), with heteroskedastic and AR1 error corrections.  * p < 0.10, ** 
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
